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Abstract 
 
Doctored images can cause people to believe in and remember experiences that never 
occurred, yet the underlying mechanism(s) responsible are not well understood. How 
does compelling false evidence distort autobiographical memory? Subjects were 
filmed observing and copying a Research Assistant performing simple actions, then 
they returned 2 days later for a memory test. Before taking the test, subjects viewed 
video-clips of simple actions, including actions that they neither observed nor 
performed earlier. We varied the format of the video-clips between-subjects to tap 
into the source-monitoring mechanisms responsible for the ‘doctored-evidence 
effect.’ The distribution of belief and memory distortions across conditions suggests 
that at least two mechanisms are involved: doctored images create an illusion of 
familiarity, and also enhance the perceived credibility of false suggestions. These 
findings offer insight into how external evidence influences source-monitoring. 
 
 
Key words: false memory; autobiographical belief; doctored images; fabricated 
evidence; source monitoring; familiarity; metacognition. 
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Why do Doctored Images Distort Memory? 
Seeing used to be believing, but image-manipulation technology is increasingly 
blurring the line between fact and fiction. Up to 75% of users on social-networking 
websites, for instance, enhance photos of themselves before posting them online 
(Wynne-Jones, 2008) and in recent years many scientific journals have adopted 
screening procedures to ensure that the images they publish are authentic (Young, 
2008). Yet image-manipulation is more than a tool for personal enhancement: 
doctored images can cause people to believe in and remember experiences that never 
occurred (see Garry & Gerrie, 2005). In this paper we ask: why are doctored images 
such an effective form of suggestion? What happens to memory when people 
encounter fabricated evidence of an event? 
The power of fake photographs and videos to foster false memories (hereafter, the 
doctored-evidence effect) is a well-established phenomenon. For instance, Wade, 
Garry, Read and Lindsay (2002) asked adult subjects to reminisce about the events 
depicted in four childhood photographs of themselves, one of which had been 
doctored to show the subject taking a hot-air balloon ride. Although no subjects had 
ever taken a balloon ride, half of them either described images or false memories of 
the pseudo-event after repeated interviewing. As well as childhood experiences, other 
research shows that doctored images can distort memory for recent experiences 
(Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009). But what are the mechanisms driving the doctored-
evidence effect? The Source Monitoring Framework (SMF; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008)—which describes how people attribute mental 
experiences to reality or to imagination—suggests several mechanisms that could be 
responsible. 
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Source Confusions    
According to the SMF, memory distortions occur when our mental images of a 
fictional event are mistaken for memories. Indeed, when our mental images possess 
the phenomenological qualities we normally associate with memories, such as a 
feeling of familiarity and rich sensory details, we can struggle to distinguish between 
imagined and real experiences (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). A SMF 
account of the doctored-evidence effect suggests that doctored images might distort 
beliefs and memories via three cognitive mechanisms. First, doctored images might 
enhance people’s feeling of familiarity with the suggested event. Second, doctored 
images could boost people’s ability to vividly imagine relevant details of the event. 
Third, people might perceive doctored images as highly credible evidence that the 
suggested event occurred, and so be willing to attribute less familiar or vivid mental 
images of the event to memory. Any of these three mechanisms—familiarity, imagery 
and credibility—could play a crucial role in the doctored-evidence effect.  
Familiarity. According to the SMF, people sometimes use the familiarity of 
mental experiences to determine their source. Because real memories typically come 
to mind rather easily and feel familiar, it is possible to misattribute an unexpected 
feeling of familiarity when thinking about a fictional experience as being caused by 
genuine recollection (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; c.f., the ‘availability heuristic’, 
described in Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In other words, if one experiences a rush 
of familiarity when an image comes to mind, one may be prone to misattributing the 
image to memory. Bernstein, Whittlesea and Loftus (2002), for instance, asked 
subjects to rate their confidence that they experienced various specific events in 
childhood (“broke a window playing ball”). Some of these events were presented with 
one keyword in anagram form (“broke a dwniwo playing ball”). Bernstein et al.’s 
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subjects reported greater confidence that they had experienced the events presented in 
anagram form than those presented in regular form. The authors proposed that 
subjects misattributed the fluency they felt when successfully solving an anagram to 
actually experiencing the event in childhood. Numerous studies show that images, 
similarly, can elicit a powerful form of ‘visual fluency’ (Winkielman, Schwarz, 
Reber, & Fazendeiro, 2003). Therefore, a familiarity account of the doctored-
evidence effect predicts that doctored images make suggested events come to mind 
more readily, and subjects misattribute this feeling of familiarity as remembering. 
Imagery. Another cue that people use to determine the source of mental images is 
the phenomenological characteristics of those images. According to the SMF, real 
memories typically contain more perceptual and conceptual details than do imagined 
events, and so imaginations that are rich in these details can be misattributed to 
memory (Johnson et al., 1988). Along these lines, Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade and 
Garry (2004) found that adult subjects were more likely to develop false memories of 
a fictional childhood event if they used their school class-photo as a memory aid. The 
researchers suggested that the class-photos might have provided subjects with visual 
details of real memories (e.g. what their teacher looked like) that overlapped with the 
suggested event and enabled subjects to construct detailed mental images that were 
misattributed as memories. Relatedly, Henkel and Carbuto (2008) showed that real 
(i.e., non-doctored) photos caused more source monitoring errors than did 
descriptions of the actions the photos portrayed. Their finding suggests that 
familiarity alone could not sufficiently account for the photo-induced memory errors, 
and thus demonstrates that familiarity and imagery are distinct mechanisms. An 
imagery-based account of the doctored-evidence effect, therefore, suggests that 
doctored images provide subjects with relevant imagery that overlaps with their other 
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memories from the time of the suggested event and that they could easily confuse 
with memories. 
Credibility. Finally, the SMF posits that people decide whether their mental 
images are, for instance, vivid or familiar enough to attribute to memory by setting 
implicit criteria that those images must match. However, it is possible that people 
might lower their criteria when an event seems likely to have occurred (Mazzoni & 
Kirsch, 2002). We know that people are more likely to accept misleading information 
from credible sources than from non-credible sources (Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 
2005; Vornik, Sharman, & Garry, 2003), therefore a credibility-based account 
suggests that doctored images might cause people to lower their source-monitoring 
criteria. Put differently, whereas people might typically attribute mental images as 
memories only when they are highly vivid or familiar, doctored photos or videos 
might be perceived as highly credible evidence that the suggested event occurred, and 
consequently lead people to attribute less vivid or familiar mental images as 
memories. 
The present experiment 
To investigate which mechanisms underlie the doctored-evidence effect, we 
adapted Nash et al.’s (2009) procedure for inducing false beliefs and memories of 
performing simple actions. Subjects were filmed as they observed and copied a 
Research Assistant (RA) performing various actions (e.g., look under the table; count 
to twenty). Later subjects were exposed to a video-sequence comprising clips of 
actions, including critical actions that the subject had neither observed nor performed. 
We manipulated the format of these video-sequences to create three between-subject 
conditions that would tap into the mechanisms described above. Specifically, Self+RA 
subjects viewed digitally-manipulated video-clips of themselves ostensibly observing 
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the RA performing critical actions. RA-Only subjects viewed video-clips identical to 
Self+RA subjects, but only saw the RA in the footage and not themselves. Stranger-
Only subjects viewed video-clips identical to RA-Only subjects, but the actions were 
performed by a stranger in an unfamiliar room. Finally subjects completed a memory 
test in which they rated the extent to which they believed they performed each action 
(Belief rating) and their memory of performing each action (Memory rating).  
Rationale for the manipulation. The distribution of Belief and Memory ratings 
across conditions should indicate the mechanisms underlying the doctored-evidence 
effect. If familiarity causes the doctored-evidence effect, then we should expect 
subjects in all three conditions to exhibit belief and memory distortions. Because all 
three videos contain clips of some person—either the RA or a stranger—performing 
critical actions, all three conditions should enable subjects to easily bring to mind (or 
fluently process) images of the critical actions. This fluent processing should cause 
illusions of familiarity, which should in turn be misattributed to recollection.   
If the imagery provided by doctored video-clips causes the doctored-evidence 
effect, then we should see more belief and memory distortions among Self+RA and 
RA-Only subjects than among Stranger-Only subjects. In the Self+RA and RA-Only 
conditions, the visual details in the video-sequence overlap with the details in 
subjects’ memories of Session 1: they depict the RA who took part in the event and 
the room where the event happened. Stranger-Only videos, however, contain visual 
details that conflict with subjects' memories: they show a stranger in a different room. 
Therefore, if the video-clips help subjects to imagine critical actions, then Self+RA 
and RA-Only subjects should be more likely to confuse imagined details for 
memories than Stranger-Only subjects. 
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Finally, if credibility causes the doctored-evidence effect, then we should see 
more belief and memory distortions among Self+RA subjects than among RA-Only 
and Stranger-Only subjects. Because Self+RA videos are the only videos in which 
subjects see themselves present while critical actions are performed, these clips 
should be compelling evidence that subjects performed those actions. 
In sum, in the present study subjects were exposed to different forms of video-
suggestion designed to differentiate between three mechanisms that potentially 
underlie the doctored-evidence effect.   
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Sixty University of Warwick students and staff members (68% female; M = 20.73 
years, SD = 4.54, Range = 18-41) individually attended two sessions over 3 days and 
received £6 for participating. The experiment was a mixed design with Critical action 
type (Video vs. Control) as a within-subjects factor and Video-sequence condition 
(Self+RA, RA-Only, or Stranger-Only) as a between-subjects factor. We randomly 
allocated subjects to video-sequence conditions. 
Materials and Procedure 
Actions. We used 42 of the simple actions used by Nash et al. (2009, Experiment 
2), and selected 4 of these to be our critical actions which an independent group of 
volunteers rated as moderately memorable (Clap your hands; Salute; Click your 
fingers; Flex your arm)1. For each subject, two of these critical actions were randomly 
assigned as Video actions (i.e., those that subjects would neither observe nor perform, 
but that would be shown in the video-suggestion), and two were assigned as Control 
actions (i.e., those that subjects would neither observe nor perform, and that subjects 
                                                
1 See Nash et al. (2009) for further details, including mean memorability ratings. 
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would not be exposed to until the memory test). Of the 38 non-critical actions, 
subjects observed and performed 26 during Session 1; the remaining 12 were new in 
the memory test in Session 2.  
Session 1: Event 
Subjects were informed that the study was investigating mental imagery and that 
they would be filmed observing and copying the RA performing various actions. The 
RA and subject sat at a table facing each other, and the remainder of Session 1 was 
filmed. The RA began by performing a non-critical action for 15 s, the subject then 
copied the same action for 15 s. Next the RA performed a second action, and so forth 
until the subject had observed and copied 26 non-critical actions (all subjects 
performed the same 26 actions in the same order). A loud beep indicated when the 
subject and RA should start and stop performing each action. Subjects neither 
observed nor performed any of the four critical actions at any stage. When the subject 
completed the final action, they were reminded to return 2 days later for Session 2. 
Creating the video-sequences. To create the Self+RA and RA-Only video-
recordings, after the subject left the lab the RA filmed herself performing two of the 
four critical actions (i.e., the Video actions), the selection of which was 
counterbalanced across subjects. For Self+RA subjects, we doctored these two extra 
clips by using a split-screen method to combine them with unused clips from other 
periods of Session 1, in which the subject was observing the RA (see Figure 1 and 
Nash et al., 2009). The doctored clips therefore ostensibly showed the subject 
watching the RA perform the critical actions. Next, we inserted the two fake clips into 
a sequence made up of 10 untouched clips of the subject observing the RA 
performing non-critical actions.  
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RA-Only subjects’ videos were identical to Self+RA subjects’, except that we 
masked the left half of all 12 clips so that the video only showed the RA. For 
Stranger-Only subjects, prior to the experiment we created four versions of a standard 
video-sequence, each version differing only in terms of the two critical actions it 
contained. For these sequences, we filmed a male volunteer performing non-critical 
and critical actions in a different room to the location of Session 1 and, as for RA-
Only sequences, we masked the left half of each clip.  
All subjects saw the same ten non-critical actions in their video, and the two 
critical actions were in 7th and 10th positions. The twelve clips lasted 10 s each, and 
were separated by 10-s pauses, thus the sequences lasted 4 min in total. 
Session 2: Suggestion and memory test 
In Session 2, subjects were seated at a computer and told they would see several 
video-clips of different actions. The experimenter did not imply that the video-clips 
were from Session 1 or otherwise. Subjects watched the video-sequence twice 
through. During the first viewing, subjects wrote down after each clip an estimate of 
the number of times in the average week they perform the action shown. During the 
second viewing, subjects wrote down after each clip the name of the action shown. 
These tasks ensured that subjects attended to each clip. Next, subjects performed a 5-
minute anagram-solving filler task. Finally, they completed a surprise memory test 
comprising the names of 28 actions, including all 4 critical actions (2 Video actions; 2 
Control actions), 12 performed actions, and 12 new actions. Subjects rated their Belief 
(1= I definitely did not do this; 8= I definitely did do this) and Memory (1= No 
memory of doing this; 8= Clear and detailed memory of doing this) of performing 
each action, as per Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch and Relyea’s (2004) Autobiographical 
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Beliefs and Memory Questionnaire. Finally, all subjects were debriefed and invited to 
attempt to identify which two actions in the video they did not perform. 
Results and Discussion 
Did our video-sequences distort subjects’ beliefs and memories? Collapsing our 
data across all subjects, we found that Video actions were assigned higher Belief 
[t(59) = 8.08, p < .0001, dz = 1.04] and Memory ratings [t(59) = 7.70, p < .0001, dz = 
.99] than Control actions. Analyzing the data separately for each condition, we found 
that subjects in all three conditions rated Video actions higher than Control actions 
(Belief, largest p = .01, smallest dz = .64; Memory, largest p = .004, smallest dz = .73). 
In other words, just seeing footage of an action being performed was sufficient to 
cause subjects some uncertainty about whether or not they performed that action, 
suggesting that a familiarity mechanism contributes to the doctored-evidence effect. 
We turn now to our main aim: to compare Belief and Memory ratings across the 
three conditions. To calculate the effect of each type of video upon subjects’ beliefs 
and memories, we subtracted subjects’ mean Control ratings from their mean Video 
ratings. We then used the net differences to compare the effects of the three video-
types. Although our initial analyses showed that all three video-types influenced 
subjects’ beliefs and memories, these additional analyses revealed significant 
differences between the three groups [Belief: F(2, 57) = 18.88, p < .0001, ηp2 = .40; 
Memory: F(2, 57) =  14.37, p < .0001, ηp2 = .34]. As Figure 2 shows, post-hoc 
analyses revealed that Self+RA videos were much more powerful than RA-Only and 
Stranger-Only videos (all ps < .001, all ds > 1.24), suggesting that a credibility 
mechanism also contributes to the doctored-evidence effect. There were no significant 
differences between the net effects of RA-Only and Stranger-Only videos on either 
Belief [t(38) = .07, p = .94, d = .02] or Memory [t(38) = .75, p = .46, d = .20]. In other 
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words, increasing the congruence between the imagery in the video-footage and in 
Session 1—in terms of the room setting or the person who performed the actions—did 
not increase belief or memory distortion over and above that explainable by a 
familiarity mechanism. It is also worth noting that there were no significant 
differences between any of the three groups in terms of ratings for Control actions 
[Belief: MSelf+RA = 2.28; MRA-Only = 1.95; MStranger-Only = 1.95; F(2, 57) = .696, p = .50, 
ηp2 = .02; Memory: MSelf+RA = 1.73; MRA-Only = 1.28; MStranger-Only = 1.33; F(2, 57) = 
1.67, p = .20, ηp2 = .06]. 
Recent research has emphasized the importance of distinguishing increases in 
confidence from actual false beliefs or memories (e.g., Smeets, Merckelbach, 
Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2005). How often did our videos induce false beliefs or false 
memories of performing critical actions, as opposed to just increasing subjects’ 
confidence that they might have performed them? To address this question we 
calculated the number of critical Video and Control actions (out of a possible 2 for 
each action type) for which subjects assigned a ‘7’ or ‘8’ rating on the Belief and 
Memory scales. We found that subjects frequently reported false beliefs and false 
memories of critical Video actions (Figure 3). In particular, Self+RA subjects 
reported more false beliefs and memories of performing critical Video actions than 
either other group (Belief: both ps < .001, both ds > 1.84; Memory: both ps < .01, 
both ds > .99). The fact that these distortions occurred within minutes of exposure to 
the videos further serves to illustrate the power of the doctored-evidence effect. 
Finally, many Self+RA subjects expressed surprise when they learnt the video had 
been doctored (“That’s really weird, I didn’t even notice!”), and when we asked 
Self+RA subjects prior to debriefing to guess what the experiment was about, only 
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two suggested a hypothesis involving fake video-evidence.2 Nevertheless, 60% of 
subjects across conditions were able to identify both critical Video actions—perhaps 
unsurprisingly given that they were asked to do so just minutes after seeing the video-
sequence. Even so, many subjects expressed uncertainty about their choices, claiming 
they were making ‘educated guesses’ by eliminating actions that were in the video-
sequence but that they recalled more strongly (“It could be ‘Click your Fingers’, 
although I’m sure I did that one”). If the doctored clips in Self+RA videos had 
seemed less than authentic, it would be reasonable to expect Self+RA subjects to 
identify more critical actions than RA-Only or Stranger-Only subjects. Yet Self+RA 
subjects identified directionally fewer critical Video actions than did the remaining 
subjects, although these differences were not significant [MSelf+RA= 1.4; MRA-Only = 
1.65; MStranger-Only = 1.65, F(2, 57) = 1.33, p = .27, ηp2 = .04]. Together these findings 
suggest that most Self+RA subjects were unaware of the trickery and that their 
memory test responses cannot be attributed to demand effects. 
Alternative accounts of the present findings 
Although the primary cause of the doctored-evidence effect appears to be a 
credibility mechanism, two alternative interpretations of our findings warrant further 
discussion. The first is that the extra details in Self+RA (and, indeed, RA-Only) 
videos could enhance the familiarity of these video-clips over Stranger-Only clips. As 
such, a familiarity mechanism alone might account for our pattern of findings. In fact, 
we have some evidence that the extra visual details did indeed boost familiarity. We 
analyzed subjects’ ratings for the 6 truly performed non-critical actions that were both 
in the video-sequences and the memory test. In line with the familiarity account, 
Belief ratings for these actions increased from Stranger-Only (M = 7.35), to RA-Only 
                                                
2 Removing these subjects from analyses did not change the pattern of findings. 
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(M = 7.77), to Self+RA (M = 7.93) subjects [F(2, 57) = 5.05, p < .01, ηp2 = .15]. The 
same was true of Memory ratings, although these differences were not significant 
[Stranger-Only, M = 7.02; RA-Only, M = 7.40; Self+RA, M = 7.50; F(2, 57) = 1.58, p 
= .21, ηp2 = .05]. Looking closer at these data, the extra detail in RA-Only (compared 
to Stranger-Only) videos was sufficient to increase subjects’ Belief ratings for the 6 
non-critical actions (p = .07), despite having no effect upon their ratings for critical 
Video actions (in fact, the difference fell in the opposite direction, p = .94). Put 
differently, although we detected that familiarity increased between these two 
conditions, this increase did not influence subjects’ critical action ratings. This finding 
suggests it is unlikely that the extra detail in Self+RA (compared to RA-Only) videos 
can explain the very high critical Video ratings in the Self+RA condition. Further 
research, though, should explore the effects of different imagery—such as images of 
oneself—upon familiarity-based recollection. 
A second interpretation of our results is that an imagery account might best 
describe the effectiveness of Self+RA videos, because they helped subjects to 
mentally picture their own appearance. If this were the case, Self+RA videos ought to 
equally help subjects to picture themselves performing any action, including actions 
that were not in the video. In line with this reasoning, Self+RA subjects’ Control 
ratings were directionally higher than those of the other two groups, suggesting that 
these subjects’ Video ratings may too have been boosted by their enhanced ability to 
imagine themselves. Yet because our analyses comparing the three conditions are 
based upon the mean difference between Video and Control ratings, the effect of 
enhanced imagery of oneself ought to be cancelled-out from these analyses. As such, 
although the self-imagery account is relevant, it cannot explain the pattern of findings 
depicted in Figure 2.  
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Conclusions 
Doctored images appear to be so effective at distorting beliefs and memories 
because as well as increasing at least one memory-like quality of people’s mental 
imagery (i.e., its familiarity), they also cause people to accept lower levels of 
memory-like qualities when attributing images of the suggested events as memories 
(i.e., due to their credibility). 
The results of the present study help to support and refine Mazzoni and Kirsch’s 
(2002) model of autobiographical beliefs and memories. Specifically, Mazzoni and 
Kirsch proposed that people might lower their criteria for attributing as memories 
their images of events that seem highly likely to have occurred. Our results provide 
strong support for this proposal. Specifically, Self+RA subjects—who saw 
themselves in the video-evidence—gave much higher ratings for Video actions than 
did the remaining subjects. The enhanced familiarity and imagery caused by seeing 
footage of oneself appear insufficient to have caused these large effects; the best 
explanation therefore, is that Self+RA subjects adopted lower source monitoring 
criteria because the evidence was simply so credible. Our data therefore offer a deeper 
understanding of the role of external evidence—as opposed to internal cognitive 
processes (Wade & Garry, 2005)—in source-monitoring. Of course, our results do not 
rule out the possibility that vivid imagery (and indeed familiarity and credibility) 
might be more important in different circumstances. For instance, when there is a long 
delay between exposure to the false images and the memory test, or when the 
suggested event supposedly occurred in the more distant past, perceptually-detailed 
mental imagery might be more influential. A full account of the doctored-evidence 
effect, therefore, may need to be sensitive to these and other situational factors.3 
                                                
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation. 
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On a practical level, the effects of false evidence are especially pertinent to the 
interrogation of criminal suspects. One reason is that certain types of forensic 
evidence, such as fingerprint-matches, have considerable potential to be unreliable 
(Dror & Charlton, 2006; Moore, 2009). Another reason is that police investigators in 
many parts of the world are legally permitted to present suspects with fabricated 
evidence to elicit a confession. False evidence, it appears, might cause innocent 
suspects to falsely confess, internalize guilt, and perhaps falsely recall the guilty act 
(Gohara, 2006; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004; Nash & Wade, 2009), and the present 
study offers further support for the case that credible yet false evidence can distort 
beliefs and memories. Suspects, investigators, and anyone else, therefore, should be 
wary of memories that suddenly surface after exposure to event-confirmatory 
evidence. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Creating the critical video clips. The top row shows untouched footage 
filmed (A) during Session 1 and (B) immediately after Session 1. The bottom row 
shows the three types of critical clips. Self+RA clips were created by combining (A) 
and (B); RA-Only clips were created using right-half of (B); Stranger-Only clips were 
created prior to experiment. 
 
Figure 2. Mean effect of each type of video upon subjects’ Belief and Memory ratings 
for critical actions (Mean Video ratings minus mean Control ratings). Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of critical actions to which subjects assigned ratings of 7 or 8 on 
the Belief (i.e, false beliefs) and Memory (i.e., false memories) scales. 
 
 22 
Figure 1. Creating the critical video clips. The top row shows untouched footage filmed (A) during 
Session 1 and (B) immediately after Session 1. The bottom row shows the three types of critical clips. 
Self+RA clips were created by combining (A) and (B); RA-Only clips were created using right-half of 
(B); Stranger-Only clips were created prior to experiment. 
Stranger-Only Video RA-Only Video Self+RA Video 
A. Clip of non-critical action 
at Session 1 
B. Clip of RA performing a 
critical action after Session 1 
Subject RA 
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Figure 2. Mean effect of each type of video upon subjects’ Belief and 
Memory ratings for critical actions (Mean Video ratings minus mean 
Control ratings). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Self+RA RA-Only Stranger-Only
Belief
Memory
M
e
a
n
 r
a
ti
n
g
 d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
 (
V
id
e
o
-C
o
n
tr
o
l)
Condition
 24 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of critical actions to which subjects assigned 
ratings of 7 or 8 on the Belief (i.e, false beliefs) and Memory (i.e., false 
memories) scales. 
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